Do Regulators Respond to Voluntary Pollution Control Efforts? A Count Data Analysis
AbstractThis article addresses whether environmental regulators are responsive to voluntary environmental behavior. Mixed results are obtained. In two of four frequently inspected manufacturing industries, state regulators do indeed undertake fewer current inspections at those plants that report lower per unit output Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) chemical releases. Moreover, regulated pollutant releases and statutory compliance history also influence inspection activity. Finally, in the pulp and paper industry, plants that account for a larger share of state manufacturing employment are inspected less frequently. In other sectors, this appears not to be the case. (JEL "K32", "L51", "Q21") Copyright 2005 Western Economic Association International.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Contemporary Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 23 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
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- Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012.
"Learning about compliance under asymmetric information,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
- Carmen Arguedas & Sandra Rousseau, 2008. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0808, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2008. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2008/02, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Christopher Decker & John Maxwell, 2012. "Environmental inspection proclivity and state manufacturing growth: the US Experience from the 1990s," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 263-282, February.
- Christopher S. Decker & John W. Maxwell, 2010. "Environmental Inspection Proclivity and State Manufacturing Growth: The US Experience from the 1990s," Working Papers 2010-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Decker, Christopher S. & Thompson, Eric C. & Wohar, Mark E., 2009. "Determinants of State Labor Productivity: The Changing Role of Density," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 39(1).
- Donna Ramirez Harrington, 2013. "Effectiveness Of State Pollution Prevention Programs And Policies," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(2), pages 255-278, 04.
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