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An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule

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Author Info
Laura Razzolini () (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business)
Michael Reksulak (Georgia Southern University)
Robert Dorsey (FNC, Inc.)

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Abstract

This paper proposes an experimental test of the strategic equilibrium properties of the serial cost sharing rule originally proposed by Shenker (1990) and then analyzed by Moulin and Shenker (1992). We report measure of the performance and efficiency of the serial mechanism by comparing the choices and payoffs attained by the subjects to the expected first best allocations. Experimental evidence shows that, while some learning is needed, the serial mechanism leads to almost efficient allocations.

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File URL: http://www.people.vcu.edu/~lrazzolini/serial.pdf
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File Function: This version, 2004
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by VCU School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0402.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0402

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eric J Friedman & Scott Schenker, 1997. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Levine's Working Paper Archive 595, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Yan Chen & Laura Razzolini & Theodore Turocy, 2007. "Congestion allocation for distributed networks: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 121-143, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 123-138, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Greenwald, Amy & Friedman, Eric J. & Shenker, Scott, 2001. "Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 80-123, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 340-368, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gailmard, Sean & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2005. "An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1361-1398, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sean Gailmard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2002. "An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods," Working Papers 0214, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Timothy N. Cason & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Secure Implementation Experiments:Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?," Discussion papers 03012, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko, 2003. "Secure Implementation: Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Working Papers 9-03-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2007. "A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing," Working Papers 0705, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  5. David Cooper, 2007. "An introduction to the symposium on behavioral game theory," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-10, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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