This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Cason, Timothy N. (Purdue U)
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi (Osaka U)
Sjostrom, Tomas (Pennsylvania State U)
Yamato, Takehiko (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and almost all strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://econ.la.psu.edu/papers/jts%284.03.1%29.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 4-03-1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:peneco:4-03-1

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 608 Kern Graduate Building, University Park, PA 16802-3306
Phone: (814)865-1456
Fax: (814)863-4775
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/info/working_papers.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak & Robert Dorsey, 2004. "An Experimental Evaluation of the Serial Cost Sharing Rule," Working Papers 0402, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Yan Chen & Robert Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1505-1535, December. [Downloadable!]
  3. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Rod Garratt & Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2004. "Behavior in Second-Price Auctions by Highly Experienced eBay Buyers and Sellers," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 04-04, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  5. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Sjöström, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko, 2003. "Secure Implementation: Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Working Papers 1174, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Mori, Toru, 2001. " Can the Pivotal Mechanism Induce Truth-Telling? An Experimental Study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 331-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Coppinger, Vicki M & Smith, Vernon L & Titus, Jon A, 1980. "Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, January.
  11. Ronald Harstad, 2000. "Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 261-280, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Attiyeh, Greg & Franciosi, Robert & Isaac, R Mark, 2000. " Experiments with the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 102(1-2), pages 95-114, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Chen, Yan, 2003. "An experimental study of serial and average cost pricing mechanisms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2305-2335, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Gary Charness & Guillaume R. Frechette & John H. Kagel, 2004. "How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 189-205, 06. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior In First, Second And Third-Price Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders," Papers 13, Houston - Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  18. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Das, Chhandita & Anderson, Christopher & Swallow, Stephen, 2006. "Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design for Discrete Choice Surveys," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21327, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005. "Secure Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Healy, Paul J., 2003. "Learning Dynamics in Mechanism Design: An Experimental Comparison of Public Goods Mechanisms," Working Papers 1182, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2007. "Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0699, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2003. "Secure Implementation:Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered," Discussion papers 03019, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hideki Mizukami & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takuma Wakayama, 2003. "Strategy-proof Sharing," Discussion papers 03017, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Mathevet, Laurent, 2007. "Supermodular Bayesian implementation: Learning and incentive design," Working Papers 1265, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.