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On Sharing the Benefits of Communication

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Author Info

  • Efthymios Athanasiou

    (Dep. of Philosophy, CMU)

  • Santanu Dey

    (ISYE, Georgia Tech)

  • Giacomo Valleta

    (Dep. of Economics, Maastricht)

Abstract

We put forward a model of private goods with externalities. Agents derive benefit from communicating with each other. In order to communicate they need to have a language in common. Learning languages is costly. In this setting no individually rational and feasible Groves mechanism exists. We characterize the best-in-class feasible Groves mechanism and the best-in-class individually rational Groves mechanism.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2012.41.

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Date of creation: May 2012
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.41

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Keywords: Groves Mechanisms; Externality; Budget Surplus or Deficit; Pareto Undominated Mechanisms;

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  1. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
  2. Rajat Deb & Laura Razzolini & Tae Seo, 2006. "The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 205-232, December.
  3. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September.
  4. McAfee, R. Preston, 1992. "A dominant strategy double auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 434-450, April.
  5. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  6. Victor Ginsburgh & Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Shlomo Weber, 2007. "Learning foreign languages: theoretical and empirical implications of the Selten and Pool model," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7274, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Jeffrey Church & Ian King, 1993. "Bilingualism and Network Externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 337-45, May.
  8. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  9. Bailey, Martin J, 1997. " The Demand Revealing Process: To Distribute the Surplus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 107-26, April.
  10. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
  11. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
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