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Monetary Policy Regimes: a fragile consensus

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Author Info
Peter Howells () (School of Economics, University of the West of England)
Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (School of Economics, University of the West of England)

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Abstract

The last fifteen years have seen the emergence of widespread consensus that optimum monetary policy is designed on the basis of three pillars: a short-term official rate of interest as the sole policy instrument and the placing of that instrument in the hands of a central bank which is (a) independent of government and (b) transparent in its decision-making. We take a critical look at each of these. In the first case, we focus attention on the failure of mainstream economics to recognise the choice of instrument and the implications of its adoption. In the case of independence we argue that he theoretical case for independence has been misunderstood and that it is not an essential requirement for successful policy. We also show that ‘independence’ is not best measured against a checklist of statutory characteristics. As regards ‘transparency’ our argument is slightly different, though we come to a similar conclusion. Unlike independence, ‘transparency’ does address a real problem for central banks. However, the evidence suggests that transparency is not the only, or even the best, solution. A variety of evidence tells us that agents can understand and anticipate the actions of the most secretive institutions.

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File URL: http://carecon.org.uk/DPs/0512.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2005
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of the West of England, School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0512.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:uwe:wpaper:0512

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Web page: http://www.uwe.ac.uk/bbs/acad/econ/econ.shtml
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Related research
Keywords: Monetary policy central banks independence transparency

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System

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  1. Jonathan Coppel & Ellis Connolly, 2003. "What Do Financial Market Data Tell Us About Monetary Policy Transparency?," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2003-05, Reserve Bank of Australia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Goodhart, Charles A E, 1994. "What Should Central Banks Do? What Should Be Their Macroeconomic Objectives and Operations?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1424-36, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Allsop, Christopher & Vines, David, 2000. "The Assessment: Macroeconomic Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 1-32, Winter.
  5. Giuseppe Fontana & Ezio Venturino, 2003. "Endogenous Money: An Analytical Approach," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(4), pages 398-416, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Teaching Modern Macroeconomics at the Principles Level," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 90-94, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Geraats, Petra M, 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Forder, James, 1998. "The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 53-71, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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