Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

'Independence' and the founding of the Federal Reserve

Contents:

Author Info

  • James Forder

Abstract

The Federal Reserve is 'independent', but contrary to opinions often expressed, it was not intended by its creators to be free from political control, although others involved in the debate over its establishment hoped that it would be. 'Independence' was independence from banking interests, not government. A gradual development of independence preceded a much greater acquisition of power during the Reagan Presidency. The lessons of history include the fact that with few changes in the Federal Reserve Act, its position in the American government has been dramatically transformed. Consequently, contrary to common practice in the economics literature, the 'independence' (from government) of a central bank evidently cannot be measured by tabulating characteristics of its statutes. Copyright (c) Scottish Economic Society 2003.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=sjpe&volume=50&issue=3&year=2003&part=null
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Scottish Economic Society in its journal Scottish Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 50 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
Pages: 297-310

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:50:y:2003:i:3:p:297-310

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0036-9292
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0036-9292

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Peter Howells & Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 2006. "Monetary Policy Regimes. A Fragile Consensus," International Journal of Political Economy, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 35(1), pages 62-83, April.
  2. Peter Howells, 2009. "Independent Central Banks: Some theoretical and empirical problems?," Discussion Papers 0908, University of the West of England, Department of Economics.
  3. Tomas Otahal & Vaclav Rybacek, 2011. "Can Tight and Centralized Financial Regulation Prevent Financial Crises? Czech Government Bond Seignorage in the Historical Perspective," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2011-14, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:50:y:2003:i:3:p:297-310

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.