Liberalization-Privatization Paths: Policies and Politics
AbstractWe empirically investigate the political determinants of deregulation policies in six network industries of 30 OECD countries over 1975-2007. We unbundle privatization and liberalization and propose an econometric study in which we allow for the joint adoption of the two policies by governments. We find, contrary to conventional wisdom, that right-wing executives tend to privatize more and to liberalize less, relative to left-wing governments. Thus, we show that ideological cleavages affect the ‘structure’ of deregulation, i.e. the way in which liberalization and privatization are combined. This result may shed new lights on the analysis of the political determinants of market-oriented policy, and suggest new issues for further theoretical and empirical research
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 609.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Liberalization; Privatization; Network Industries; Partisanship.;
Other versions of this item:
- Filippo BELLOC & Antonio NICITA, 2011. "Liberalization-privatization paths: policies and politics," Departmental Working Papers 2011-32, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-HME-2011-07-02 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2011-07-02 (Network Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-07-02 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-07-02 (Regulation)
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