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Are Imitative Strategies Game Specific? Experimental Evidence from Market Games

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Author Info
Niall O'Higgins ()
Patrizia Sbriglia ()

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Abstract

This paper studies imitation in price and quantity markets. We analyse the results of two experiments designed with different information settings. The analysis shows that information is used differently and has diverse effects according to the market under investigation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Siena in its series Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena with number 011.

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Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:usi:labsit:011

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Related research
Keywords: Cournot; Bertrand experiments; imitation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Karandikar, Rajeeva & Mookherjee, Dilip & Ray, Debraj & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1998. "Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 292-331, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  3. Jose Apesteguia & Steffen Huck & Jörg Oechssler, 2005. "Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence -," Working Papers 0419, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Altavilla, Carlo & Luini, Luigi & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2006. "Social learning in market games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 632-652, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.


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