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Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

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  • Dahm, Matthias
  • González, Paula
  • Porteiro Fresco, Nicolás

Abstract

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2072/5360.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/5360

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Keywords: Indústria farmacèutica; Comunicació científica; Assaigs clínics; Coneixement científic; 338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió; control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus;

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  1. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
  2. Grabowski, Henry G. & Vernon, John M., 1994. "Returns to R&D on new drug introductions in the 1980s," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 383-406.
  3. Gérard Pouvourville, 2006. "Risk-sharing agreements for innovative drugs," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 155-157, September.
  4. Brekke, Kurt R. & Kuhn, Michael, 2003. "Direct-to-Consumer Advertising in Pharmaceutical Markets," Working Papers in Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics 05/03, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  5. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000. "Informational Lobbying And Political Contributions," Working Papers, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics 08-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  6. Pierre Azoulay, 2002. "Do Pharmaceutical Sales Respond to Scientific Evidence?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 551-594, December.
  7. Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 749, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Working Papers 06.14, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
  9. DiMasi, Joseph A. & Hansen, Ronald W. & Grabowski, Henry G., 2003. "The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 151-185, March.
  10. Lewis Tracy R. & Reichman Jerome H. & So Anthony D., 2007. "The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical Trials," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-4, January.
  11. Schmalensee, Richard, 1976. "A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 493-507, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Daniel Stone, 2011. "A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 397-424, September.

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