Domestic and International Research Joint Ventures: The Effect of Collusion
AbstractWe analyze the effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) on consumer welfare in an international context when collusion can occur. The main novelty of our analysis is to study the differentiated effect of domestic and international RJVs. The recent literature shows that RJVs with collusion harm consumers. However, our results introduce a qualifi cation to this statement: international RJVs with collusion might be bene ficial for consumers when internationalization costs are high. The EU and US competition policy advises against RJVs that facilitate collusion on the grounds of their expected negative effects. Our results suggest that antitrust authorities should distinguish between domestic and international RJVs and, in certain cases, be more benevolent with international RJVs. Keywords: collusion; domestic research joint venture; international research joint venture JEL Classi fication Numbers: K21, L24, L44, O32
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2072/211880.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Competència econòmica -- Dret i legislació; Aliança d'empreses; Innovacions tecnològiques -- Direcció i administració; Investigació industrial -- Direcció i administració; 33 - Economia;
Other versions of this item:
- Flores-Fillol, Ricardo & Ibañez-Zarate, Guiomar & Theilen, Bernd, 2014. "Domestic and international research joint ventures: The effect of collusion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 79-83.
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
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