A simple game-theoretical framework for studying R&D expenditures and R&D cooperation
AbstractThis paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of knowledge firms can absorb is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g. firms? absorptive capacity is treated as an endogenous variable. It is shown that cooperating firms invest more in R&D than non?cooperating firms if spillovers are sufficiently large. The degree of market competition is a key determinant of the effects of research cooperation on research efforts, implying that existing models which assume perfect competition might be too restrictive. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 01-22.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
research cooperation; research expenditures; knowledge spillovers;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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