Optimal production of transplant care services
AbstractMost organ transplants are from dead donors. National transplant organizations exhibit considerable differences in terms of their donor population rates. Spain’s organization is by far the most efficient in this respect. We argue that much of the productivity advantage of Spain’s transplant organization proceeds from an efficient organization of the production chain, from organ procurement to transplantation. Transplant inputs from dead donors are analogous to a common resource for the transplant community. Their circulation through the national transplant organization creates public good externalities between the care units in charge of organ extraction and those in charge of transplantation. It is shown that a socially efficient production of transplant services requires an optimal control of both the production and the circulation of transplant inputs by the institutions of the transplant system.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2009-19.
Date of creation: 2009
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organ transplants; donation; public goods; production organization.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- L38 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Policy
- L53 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Enterprise Policy
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