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Contagion and the Emergence of Convention in Small Worlds

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  • Edward Cartwright

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Abstract

We model a simple dynamic process in which boundedly rational agents learn through their interactions with others. Of interest is to study the process of contagion where by one action 'spreads throughout the population' and becomes conventional. We vary the network of player interaction between a regular lattice and a random network allowing us to model contagion in small world networks. Through simulation results we highlight the importance of network structure on both the possibility of contagion and the rate of contagion.

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File URL: ftp://ftp.ukc.ac.uk/pub/ejr/RePEc/ukc/ukcedp/0414.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0414.

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Date of creation: Oct 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0414

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
Phone: +44 (0)1227 764000
Fax: +44 (0)1227 827850
Web page: http://www.ukc.ac.uk/economics/

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Keywords: Best reply; risk dominant; contagion; small world;

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  1. Edward Cartwright, 2002. "Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000070, David K. Levine.
  2. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  3. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  4. Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994.
  5. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  6. repec:att:wimass:9324 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
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