Fast Learning in Organizations
AbstractThis paper explores how efficiency structures language. It starts from the premise that one of language's central characteristics is to provide a means for saying novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity. As such it is a metaphor for the choice of organizational forms that can cope with a changing environment. It is shown how creative language use is achieved via reliance on common knowledge structures, even if those structures are consistent with an a priori absence of a common language.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97-10.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
More information through EDIRC
GAME THEORY ; LANGUAGES;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1996. "Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 343-55, March.
- Blume, A., 1993.
"Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games,"
93-15, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993.
"Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication,"
93-07, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 92-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- A. Blume & Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 530, David K. Levine.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1996. "Structure and Strategy in Collective Action: Communication and Coordination in Social Networks," Working Papers 96-12-092, Santa Fe Institute.
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