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Oportunidades de comercio internacional eléctrico y reglas de reparto del beneficio modeladas por juegos de negociación repetidos

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  • Mario Ibarburu

    ()
    (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

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    Abstract

    International electricity spot trade between two countries is modeled as a sequence of bargaining games, one for each trade opportunity. Each game has a benefit per time unit and random duration. There is a correspondence between this trade game and the bargaining game for the partition of a pie studied by Rubinstein. If the game admits the possibility of “money burning”, actions by a player to destroy surplus to punish the other player’s rejection of an offer, each game admits multiple inefficient perfect Nash equilibria, with delay in the partition. Conditions are found for the existence of predefined agreements between the players, sustaining efficient immediate partition in each game, as an alternative to inefficient Nash equilibria in the sequence of games.

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    File URL: http://www.fcs.edu.uy/archivos/3011.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 3011.

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    Length: 33 pages
    Date of creation: Dec 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:3011

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    Related research

    Keywords: bargaining games; international trade; energy;

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    1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
    2. Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
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