Political support for the private system to finance political parties
AbstractIn a Downsian model of political competition we compare the equilibrium tax and redistribution level obtained from two systems to finance parties' political campaigns: the public and the private system. In the private system ideological voters make campaign contributions to increase the chances of winning of their preferred party. In the public system parties receive funds from the government. If voters are sufficiently ideological the private system induces high aggregate spending. Nevertheless, it may be supported by a majority of voters given the indirect effect contributions have on the equilibrium redistribution level and parties' probability of winning.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada in its series DEA Working Papers with number 35.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Political economy; redistribution; campaign finance.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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