This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Pre-Marital Investment Game

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Peters, Michael

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://microeconomics.ca/michael_peters/matching_limit_sim.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Main Text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number peters-04-02-18-01-42-09.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 18 Feb 2004
Date of revision: 13 Sep 2006
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-04-02-18-01-42-09

Contact details of provider:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael Peters).

Related research
Keywords: human capital; pre-marital investment; assortative matching;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Bulow, Jeremy I. & Levin, Jonathan, 2003. "Matching and Price Competition," Research Papers 1818, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," CARESS Working Papres 00-05, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    Other versions:
  3. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  4. Felli, Leonhardo & Roberts, Kevin, 2000. "Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Rosen, Sherwin, 1974. "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 34-55, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nosaka, Hiromi, 2007. "Specialization and competition in marriage models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 104-119, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Allen, Beth & Hellwig, Martin, 1986. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(2), pages 175-204, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Peters, Michael, 2005. "The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-05-12-16-12-42-35, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Mar 2006. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ed Hopkins, 2006. "Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000553, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2006. "Which Inequality? The Inequality of Resources Versus the Inequality of Rewards," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000621, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," IZA Discussion Papers 2454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Peters, Michael, 2006. "Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-06-04-11-02-42-39, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 03 Mar 2009. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hoppe, Heidrun C. & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2006. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals," CEPR Discussion Papers 5543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Stratification and Growth in Agent-based Matching Markets," Working papers 2008-30, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2005. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2005-001, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Ostrovsky, Michael & Schwarz, Michael, 2007. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," Research Papers 1965, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Peters, Michael, 2004. "Innis Lecture: Hedonic Equilibrium," Micro Theory Working Papers peters-04-07-30-12-06-27, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 08 Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment," Working papers 2008-45, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.