The Pre-Marital Investment Game
AbstractTwo sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Microeconomics.ca Website in its series Micro Theory Working Papers with number peters-04-02-18-01-42-09.
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Date of creation: 18 Feb 2004
Date of revision: 13 Sep 2006
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human capital; pre-marital investment; assortative matching;
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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- Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh) and V. Bhaskar (University College London), 2011.
"Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching,"
ESE Discussion Papers
210, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Bhaskar, V. & Hopkins, Ed, 2011. "Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching," SIRE Discussion Papers 2011-65, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Hopkins, Ed, 2011. "Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching," CEPR Discussion Papers 8529, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ed Hopkins, 2006.
"Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence,"
321307000000000553, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ed Hopkins, 2012. "Job Market Signaling Of Relative Position, Or Becker Married To Spence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 290-322, 04.
- Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence," ESE Discussion Papers 134, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- James W. Boudreau, 2008.
"Stratification and Growth in Agent-based Matching Markets,"
2008-30, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Boudreau, James W., 2010. "Stratification and growth in agent-based matching markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 168-179, August.
- Raphaela Hyee, 2011. "Education in a Marriage Market Model without Commitment," Working Papers 683, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment," Working papers 2008-45, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Bjerk, David, 2009. "Beauty vs. earnings: Gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 248-259, March.
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