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The Pre-Marital Investment Game

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  • Peters, Michael

Abstract

Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number peters-04-02-18-01-42-09.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 18 Feb 2004
Date of revision: 13 Sep 2006
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-04-02-18-01-42-09

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Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/

Related research

Keywords: human capital; pre-marital investment; assortative matching;

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References

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  1. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2001. "Competing Premarital Investment," Working Papers peters-01-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence," ESE Discussion Papers 134, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  3. Nosaka, Hiromi, 2007. "Specialization and competition in marriage models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 104-119, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2014. "Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 174-189.
  2. Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Hopkins, Ed, 2011. "Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching," CEPR Discussion Papers 8529, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Ed Hopkins, 2012. "Job Market Signaling Of Relative Position, Or Becker Married To Spence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 290-322, 04.
  4. Georg Noldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2014. "Investment and Competitive Matching," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1946, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Stratification and Growth in Agent-based Matching Markets," Working papers 2008-30, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  6. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment," Working papers 2008-45, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  7. Raphaela Hyee, 2011. "Education in a Marriage Market Model without Commitment," Working Papers 683, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  8. Bjerk, David, 2009. "Beauty vs. earnings: Gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 248-259, March.

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