Who Benefits from Tax Evasion?
AbstractIn this paper, we examine the distributional effects of tax evasion, using results from theoretical, experimental, empirical, and especially the general equilibrium literatures on tax evasion. Much, if not all, of this evidence concludes that the main beneficiaries of successful tax evasion are the tax evaders themselves, with distributional effects that largely favor higher income individuals. However, when general equilibrium adjustments in commodity and factor prices are considered, the distributional effects become considerably more complicated. The work on tax compliance is also put in the broader context of the distributional effects of other types of criminal activities, where similar forces seem to be at work. We conclude with some suggestions for future research.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tulane University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1214.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
tax evasion; general equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2012-08-23 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-IUE-2012-08-23 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-08-23 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2012-08-23 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Edwards & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2010. "The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number dite09-1, October.
- Watson, Harry, 1985. "Tax evasion and labor markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 231-246, July.
- James Alm & Mikhail I. Melnik, 2012. "Cross-border Shopping and State Use Tax Liabilities: Evidence from eBay Transactions," Working Papers 1205, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, June.
- Anderson, David A, 1999. "The Aggregate Burden of Crime," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 611-42, October.
- Jung, Young H. & Snow, Arthur & Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Tax evasion and the size of the underground economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 391-402, July.
- Persson, Mats & Wissen, Pehr, 1984. " Redistributional Aspects of Tax Evasion," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(2), pages 131-49.
- Leigh Linden & Jonah E. Rockoff, 2008. "Estimates of the Impact of Crime Risk on Property Values from Megan's Laws," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1103-27, June.
- Agnar Sandmo, 2012. "An evasive topic: theorizing about the hidden economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 5-24, February.
- Pope, Jaren C., 2008. "Fear of crime and housing prices: Household reactions to sex offender registries," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 601-614, November.
- Arnold C. Harberger, 1962. "The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 215.
- Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N, 1991. "Tax Base Erosion in Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(4), pages 849-72, July.
- James Alm & Mikhail I. Melnik, 2011. "Do eBay Sellers Comply with State Sales Taxes?," Working Papers 1106, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Alm, James, 1985. "The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(2), pages 243-63, April.
- Ayse Imrohoroglu & Antonio Merlo & Peter Rupert, 1996.
"On the political economy of income redistribution and crime,"
9609, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 2000. "On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 1996. "On the political economy of income redistribution and crime," Bulletins 7497, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Ayse Imrohoroglu & Antonio Merlo & Peter Rupert, 1996. "On the political economy of income redistribution and crime," Staff Report 216, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
- Kehoe, Timothy J. & Serra-Puche, Jaime, 1983. "A computational general equilibrium model with endogenous unemployment : An analysis of the 1980 fiscal reform in Mexico," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-26, October.
- Kesselman, Jonathan R., 1989. "Income tax evasion : An intersectoral analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 137-182, March.
- Furlong, William J., 1987. "A general equilibrium model of crime commission and prevention," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 87-103, October.
- Alm, James & Jackson, Betty R. & McKee, Michael, 1993. "Fiscal exchange, collective decision institutions, and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 285-303, December.
- Thalmann, Philippe, 1992. "Factor taxes and evasion in general equilibrium," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 259-283, June.
- Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan, 2012.
"Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply,"
Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series
03-10, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2012. "Experimental Evidence on the Relationship between Tax Evasion Opportunities and Labor Supply," IZA Discussion Papers 6914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Finlay).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.