AbstractWhen does it pay a coalition of buyers and a coalition of sellers to by-pass a noncooperative market outcome by negotiating an alternative contract? Should these collective contracts be allowed? This paper investigates one source of the incentive for collective contracting: the failure of monopolistically competitive markets to achieve the optimal trade-off between lower costs and greater variety or availability of products. A collective contract benefits buyers inside the coalition but imposes a negative externality on buyers outside the coalition, who face higher prices and lower availability when the contract is allowed. We analyze the conditions under which the collective contracts increase total welfare. We suggest that the model represents one component of the incentives for "managed competition" in health care markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number rwinter-96-01.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 11 Aug 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario
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buyer groups; monopolistic competition; managed care; preferred provider organizations;
Other versions of this item:
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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CEIS Research Paper
107, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Jul 2008.
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- Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2012. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 714-730.
- Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, 1998. "The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 57-84, April.
- Mattoo, Aaditya, 2001. "Can no competition policy be better than some competition policy?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 55-77, January.
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