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Buyer Groups

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  • G. Frank Mathewson
  • Ralph A. Winter

Abstract

When does it pay a coalition of buyers and a coalition of sellers to by-pass a noncooperative market outcome by negotiating an alternative contract? Should these collective contracts be allowed? This paper investigates one source of the incentive for collective contracting: the failure of monopolistically competitive markets to achieve the optimal trade-off between lower costs and greater variety or availability of products. A collective contract benefits buyers inside the coalition but imposes a negative externality on buyers outside the coalition, who face higher prices and lower availability when the contract is allowed. We analyze the conditions under which the collective contracts increase total welfare. We suggest that the model represents one component of the incentives for "managed competition" in health care markets.

Suggested Citation

  • G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, 1995. "Buyer Groups," Working Papers rwinter-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:rwinter-96-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    3. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Øystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind, 2017. "Upstream Partnerships among Competitors when Size Matters," CESifo Working Paper Series 6512, CESifo.
    2. Mattoo, Aaditya, 1999. "Can no antitrust policy be better than some antitrust policy?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2191, The World Bank.
    3. Chris Doyle & Martijn Han, 2014. "Cartelization Through Buyer Groups," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(3), pages 255-275, May.
    4. Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2012. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 714-730.
    5. Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, 2015. "Cameras tracking shoppers: the economics of retail video surveillance," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 235-257, December.
    6. Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, 1998. "The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(1), pages 57-84, April.
    7. David Mills, 2010. "Buyer Power and Industry Structure," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(3), pages 213-225, May.
    8. Roman Inderst & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2011. "Buyer Power And The ‘Waterbed Effect’," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 1-20, March.
    9. Mattoo, Aaditya, 2001. "Can no competition policy be better than some competition policy?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 55-77, January.
    10. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Competition or collusion? Negotiating discounts off posted prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 341-354, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    buyer groups; monopolistic competition; managed care; preferred provider organizations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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