Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Krasteva, Silvana
  • Yildirim, Huseyin
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined. It is shown that the buyer (weakly) prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. With substitute goods, such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short deadlines that prevent a head-to-head competition. With complementary goods, strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for sellers, which is likely to be the case when sellers possess high bargaining powers; their price offers have short deadlines; and/or goods are weak complements. Sellersʼ strategic deadline choices as well as their incentives to disclose information about negotiations are also investigated.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000401
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 714-730

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:714-730

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords: Public negotiations; Private negotiations; Exploding offers; Open-ended offers; Bargaining power;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting With Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388, May.
    2. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals," Discussion Papers 1457, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Winter, Eyal, 1997. "Negotiations in multi-issue committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 323-342, September.
    4. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
    5. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
    6. Horn, H. & Wolinsky, A., 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies And Incentives For Merger," Papers 410, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    7. Peters, Michael, 2003. "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-109, July.
    8. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410, July.
    9. Mathewson, Frank & Winter, Ralph A., 1997. "Buyer groups," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 137-164, April.
      • G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, 1995. "Buyer Groups," Working Papers rwinter-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    10. Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2006. "Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 71-100, November.
    11. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Ordered bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1126-1143, October.
    13. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2009. "Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common-agency games," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 78-102.
    14. Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2007. "Rent shifting and the order of negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1109-1125, October.
    15. Thomas H. Noe & Jun Wang, 2004. "Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 855-881, 07.
    16. Chaim Fershtman, 1986. "The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining," Discussion Papers 689, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Robert Marshall & Antonio Merlo, 1996. "Pattern bargaining," Staff Report 220, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
      • Robert C. Marshall & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "Pattern Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 239-255, 02.
    18. Moller, Marc, 2007. "The timing of contracting with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 484-503, March.
    19. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 757-791, 05.
    20. Curtis R. Taylor, 2004. "Consumer Privacy and the Market for Customer Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 631-650, Winter.
    21. Thomas H. Noe & Jun Wang, 2004. "Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 855-881.
    22. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1992. "Search Equilibrium with Endogenous Recall," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 184-202, Summer.
    23. Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2010. "Break-up fees and bargaining power in sequential contracting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 451-463, September.
    24. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 260-276, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:714-730. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.