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Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy

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Author Info

  • Paul Levine

    (University of Surrey and LBS)

  • Paul Levine

    (University of Surrey and LBS)

  • Jon Stern

    (LBS and NERA)

  • Francesc Trillas

    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and LBS)

Abstract

This paper explores the similarity of the underlying economic problems that lead to the establishment of (a) independent central banks to operate national monetary policies and (b) independent regulatory agencies for telecommunications and other utility service industries. We show that, in both cases, the adoption of agencies inde- pendent of government results from the need to achieve credibility and a reputation for economically sound long-run behaviour while preserving signi¯cant discretion to handle unanticipated events. We show that this solution is superior to policy rules that are ¯xed in advance. Both for central banks and regulatory agencies, what is re- quired are institutions that provide limited and accountable discretion within a clear policy framework, for example via high levels of accountability and transparency in their decision making processes. On the basis of a review of the empirical literature, we argue that central banks with superior governance arrangements, particularly on accountability and transparency, out-perform those with inferior arrangements and we discuss how this work might be extended to utility regulatory agencies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Surrey in its series School of Economics Discussion Papers with number 0403.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sur:surrec:0403

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Web page: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/economics/
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Related research

Keywords: Monetary policy; credibility; regulation; under-investment; delegation.;

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References

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  1. Paul L. Joskow, 2001. "California's Electricity Crisis," NBER Working Papers 8442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  3. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 421-52.
  4. Currie,David & Levine,Paul, 2009. "Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521104609.
  5. Levine, Paul & Currie, David, 1985. "Optimal feedback rules in an open economy macromodel with rational expectations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 141-163, March.
  6. Brown, Gordon, 2001. "The Conditions for High and Stable Growth and Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(471), pages C30-44, May.
  7. Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 2002. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Spulber, Daniel F & Besanko, David, 1992. "Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 126-54, March.
  9. Ros, Agustin J, 1999. "Does Ownership or Competition Matter? The Effects of Telecommunications Reform on Network Expansion and Efficiency," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 65-92, January.
  10. Cowen, T. & Glazer, A. & Zajc, K., 1995. "Credibility May Require Discretion, not Rules," Papers 94-95-27, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  11. repec:reg:wpaper:527 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  13. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  14. Alexander, Ian & Mayer, Colin & Weeds, Helen, 1996. "Regulatory structure and risk and infrastructure firms : an international comparison," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1698, The World Bank.
  15. Olivier Boylaud & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2000. "Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecommunications," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 237, OECD Publishing.
  16. Pablo T. Spiller & Ingo Vogelsang, 1997. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(4), pages 607-, December.
  17. Abdala, Manuel A., 2000. "Institutional roots of post-privatisation regulatory outcomes," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(8-9), pages 645-668, September.
  18. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 2002. "Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 153-174, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Stern, Jon & Cubbin, John, 2005. "Regulatory effectiveness : the impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3536, The World Bank.
  2. Gual, Jordi & Trillas, Francesco, 2004. "Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact," CEPR Discussion Papers 4578, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Bel, Germà, 2004. "Estado ¿versus? Mercado/State ¿Versus? Market," Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Estudios de Economía Aplicada, vol. 22, pages 231-249, Agosto.
  4. Vagliasindi, Maria, 2012. "The role of regulatory governance in driving PPPs in electricity transmission and distribution in developing countries : a cross-country analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6121, The World Bank.
  5. Stern, J. & Cubbin, J., 2004. "Regulatory effectiveness: the impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes: a review paper," Working Papers 04/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
  6. Cubbin, J. & Stern, J., 2004. "Regulatory effectiveness: the impact of good regulatory governance on electricity industry capacity and efficiency in developing countries," Working Papers 04/04, Department of Economics, City University London.

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