Gual, Jordi () (IESE Business School) Trillas, Francesc () (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Abstract
This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization policies and the independence of regulators for a cross-section of countries. These indices are combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications policies. The authors find that liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. They also find that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the behavior of the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when the endogeneity of regulatory independence is taken into account.
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Paper provided by IESE Business School in its series IESE Research Papers with number
D/510.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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[Downloadable!]