We present a model where producers of complementary goods have the option to practice mixed bundling. In the first stage of a two- stage game, firms choose between a mixed bundling and a non- bundling strategy. In the second stage, firms choose prices. We show that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms. However, when the composite goods are not very close substitutes, at the bundling-bundling equilibrium both firms are worse off than when they both commit not to practice mixed bundling.
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Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
93-29.
Length: Date of creation: Nov 1993 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:93-29
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ordover, Janusz A. & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C., 1988.
"Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure,"
Working Papers
88-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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