Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

A Stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mukhopadhyay, Samar K.
  • Yue, Xiaohang
  • Zhu, Xiaowei
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader–follower type move. Each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm. We show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally. We then devise a “simple to implement” information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off. We also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527309004174
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Production Economics.

    Volume (Year): 134 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (December)
    Pages: 424-433

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:134:y:2011:i:2:p:424-433

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijpe

    Related research

    Keywords: Uncertainty Information sharing Demand forecasting Complementary products Decision making Combining forecasts;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Miklos Sarvary & Philip M. Parker, 1997. "Marketing Information: A Competitive Analysis," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(1), pages 24-38.
    2. Jagmohan S. Raju & Abhik Roy, 2000. "Market Information and Firm Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(8), pages 1075-1084, August.
    3. Wang, Li Ming & Liu, Li Wen & Wang, Yong Jie, 2007. "Capacity decisions and supply price games under flexibility of backward integration," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(1-2), pages 85-96, October.
    4. Charles J. Corbett & Deming Zhou & Christopher S. Tang, 2004. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(4), pages 550-559, April.
    5. Yossi Aviv, 2002. "Gaining Benefits from Joint Forecasting and Replenishment Processes: The Case of Auto-Correlated Demand," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 4(1), pages 55-74, December.
    6. Timothy W. McGuire & Richard Staelin, 1983. "An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(2), pages 161-191.
    7. Martin, Stephen, 1999. "Strategic and welfare implications of bundling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 371-376, March.
    8. Au, Kin-Fan & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Yu, Yong, 2008. "Fashion retail forecasting by evolutionary neural networks," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 615-630, August.
    9. Abel P. Jeuland & Steven M. Shugan, 1983. "Managing Channel Profits," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 239-272.
    10. Choi, Tsan-Ming, 2007. "Pre-season stocking and pricing decisions for fashion retailers with multiple information updating," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 146-170, March.
    11. Hau L. Lee & Kut C. So & Christopher S. Tang, 2000. "The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(5), pages 626-643, May.
    12. S. Chan Choi, 1991. "Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 271-296.
    13. Raith, Michael, 1996. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 260-288, October.
    14. Lode Li, 2002. "Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm288, Yale School of Management.
    15. Mukhopadhyay, Samar K. & Ma, Huafan, 2009. "Joint procurement and production decisions in remanufacturing under quality and demand uncertainty," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 5-17, July.
    16. Özalp Özer & Wei Wei, 2006. "Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(8), pages 1238-1257, August.
    17. Srinagesh Gavirneni & Roman Kapuscinski & Sridhar Tayur, 1999. "Value of Information in Capacitated Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(1), pages 16-24, January.
    18. Terry A. Taylor & Erica L. Plambeck, 2007. "Supply Chain Relationships and Contracts: The Impact of Repeated Interaction on Capacity Investment and Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1577-1593, October.
    19. Robert L. Winkler, 1981. "Combining Probability Distributions from Dependent Information Sources," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(4), pages 479-488, April.
    20. Lode Li, 2002. "Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(9), pages 1196-1212, September.
    21. Robert C. Blattberg & Stephen J. Hoch, 1990. "Database Models and Managerial Intuition: 50% Model + 50% Manager," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(8), pages 887-899, August.
    22. Cai, Gangshu (George) & Zhang, Zhe George & Zhang, Michael, 2009. "Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 80-96, January.
    23. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    24. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    25. Gérard P. Cachon & Martin A. Lariviere, 2001. "Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(5), pages 629-646, May.
    26. Yossi Aviv, 2001. "The Effect of Collaborative Forecasting on Supply Chain Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(10), pages 1326-1343, October.
    27. Yue, Xiaohang & Mukhopadhyay, Samar K. & Zhu, Xiaowei, 2006. "A Bertrand model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 59(10-11), pages 1182-1192, October.
    28. Kurata, Hisashi & Yue, Xiaohang, 2008. "Trade promotion mode choice and information sharing in fashion retail supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 507-519, August.
    29. Yao, Dong-Qing & Kurata, Hisashi & Mukhopadhyay, Samar K., 2008. "Incentives to reliable order fulfillment for an Internet drop-shipping supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 324-334, May.
    30. Charles J. Corbett & Xavier de Groote, 2000. "A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(3), pages 444-450, March.
    31. Yao, Dong-Qing & Yue, Xiaohang & Wang, Xiaoyin & Liu, John J., 2005. "The impact of information sharing on a returns policy with the addition of a direct channel," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 196-209, August.
    32. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 1994. "Sleeping with the Enemy: Should Competitors Share the Same Advertising Agency?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(2), pages 190-202.
    33. Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Differentiation and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 407-14, May.
    34. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-43, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Wei, Jie & Zhao, Jing & Li, Yongjian, 2013. "Pricing decisions for complementary products with firms’ different market powers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(3), pages 507-519.
    2. Xu, Su Xiu & Lu, Qiang & Huang, George Q. & Zhang, Ting, 2013. "Scope economies, market information, and make-or-buy decision under asymmetric information," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 339-348.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:134:y:2011:i:2:p:424-433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.