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L’Eurosystème: un mécanisme de transferts en faveur des pays déficitaires ? Le débat

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  • André Grjebine

    (Centre d'études et de recherches internationales)

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    Abstract

    À l’initiative de plusieurs économistes, en premier lieu du Professeur Hans-Werner Sinn, président de l’Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Ifo) de Munich , un vif débat s’est engagé sur la signification véritable et les risques inhérents au système de compensation qui fonctionne au sein de la zone euro, TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer). Trois critiques sont principalement émises. La première affirme que le système TARGET2 est, en fait, l’instrument privilégié et inavoué utilisé par l’Eurosystème pour renflouer des États européens en difficulté au détriment d’autres États de la zone euro, en premier lieu de l’Allemagne. La deuxième critique consiste à dire que les crédits accordés dans le cadre de TARGET2 à un pays déficitaire le sont au détriment des autres pays de la zone euro. De ce fait, les pays déficitaires occupent une place prépondérante dans la création monétaire de la zone euro. La troisième annonce que les difficultés des débiteurs vont se transmettre aux créanciers de TARGET2 et mettre ceux-ci, à leur tour, en difficulté. De nombreux auteurs ont contesté ces critiques. Ils montrent les risques de blocage de la zone euro qu’induirait une limitation drastique du système de compensation qu’assure TARGET2. Ceci dit, si ce système a sans doute puissamment contribué à ce que la zone euro surmonte temporairement les déséquilibres commerciaux et financiers qui risquaient d’entraîner son explosion, ce n’est qu’en s’attaquant aux déséquilibres structurels entre les pays membres que la pérennité de celle-ci pourra être assurée.

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    Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number info:hdl:2441/eo6779thqgm5r489maqa474kg.

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    Date of creation: Feb 2013
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    Publication status: Published in Revue de l'OFCE - Analyse et prévisions, 2013, pp.269-298
    Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/eo6779thqgm5r489maqa474kg

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