Tilting the Playing Field (Why a sports league planner would choose less, not more, competitive balance): The case of English Football
AbstractIt has traditionally been argued that the organizer of a sports league would prefer more competitive balance to the level that emerges in a noncooperative equilibrium. This argument has been used to justify restraints on competition between teams, which also tend to raise profits at the expense of players and consumers. This paper shows that in theory a planner would prefer less, not more, competitive balance. The paper uses data from the second tier of professional English league football to show just how unbalanced a league planner would choose.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists in its series Working Papers with number 0619.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
competitive balance; sports leagues; football; soccer;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roger Noll, 2002. "The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The Cases of English Football," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(2), pages 169-203, May.
- Martin B. Schmidt & David J. Berri, 2001. "Competitive Balance and Attendance: The Case of Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(2), pages 145-167, May.
- SZYMANSKI, Stefan & KÉSENNE, Stefan, 2003.
"Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports,"
2003003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Stefan Szymanski & Stefan KÈsenne, 2004. "Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 165-177, 03.
- Dobson,Stephen & Goddard,John, 2011. "The Economics of Football," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521517140.
- Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
- Roger G. Noll, 2007.
"Broadcasting and Team Sports,"
06-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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