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The Response of Taxpayer Compliance to the Large Shock of Italian Unification

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Abstract

The unification of Italy in 1861 determined that all institutions of the pre-unitary states were replaced by those of the new-born Kingdom of Italy, thus implying common rules for agents formerly obeying to different ones. Moreover, a major tax reform was also set in that determined differential increments of the tax burden across provinces. We investigate the potential implications of these events for tax compliance. By comparing a province-level measure of tax evasion just after the reform with a corresponding recent one, we show a strong process of convergence in compliance. Non-negligible spatial differences in tax evasion, however, still persist nowadays. Further empirical evidence suggests that such differences can be at least in part traced back to the tax reform.

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  • Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Marisa Ratto, 2019. "The Response of Taxpayer Compliance to the Large Shock of Italian Unification," CSEF Working Papers 551, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 07 Aug 2020.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:551
    Note: This paper has circulated previously with the title “Long-run Effects of a Change in Institutions: Evidence on Tax Compliance “
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    Cited by:

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    2. Sergio Galletta & Tommaso Giommoni, 2024. "War Violence Exposure and Tax Compliance," CESifo Working Paper Series 11230, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax evasion dynamics; decentralization; local enforcement externality; learning.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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