On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters
AbstractGame-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. It is, however, the case that these types of models do not capture many real world mixed fisheries, where species are bio-logical independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting biodiversity preservation by setting up a two species model with the aim of ensuring both species survive harvesting of exploiters adapting a non-cooperative behaviour. The model starts out as a multi-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to include also biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the limits on the number of players preserving both species including the conditions to be satisfied. For visual purposes we simulate a two species model with different kind of interrelationship.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 79/08.
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Biodiversity preservation; non-cooperative game; multi-species fisheries; bio-economic modelling;
Other versions of this item:
- Kronbak, Lone Gr�nb�k & Lindroos, Marko, 2010. "On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 49-70, October.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-01-24 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-01-24 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Quérou, N. & Tomini, A., 2013.
"Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries,"
Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 192-201.
- Nicolas Quérou & Agnès Tomini, 2012. "Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries," Working Papers 12-32, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2012.
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