A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries
AbstractCoastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishing firms that operate in their Exclusive Economic Zone. We develop a game-theoretical model in which a fishery owner maximizes the revenue that it collects from firms that operate in its EEZ by charging them a fishing fee. We find that if the number of firms is exogenous and finite the owner is likely to select a fee that is higher than socially optimal. On the other hand, if the owner can choose the number of firms it does not place any restrictions on entry to the EEZ and selects a fee that maximizes net return.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 200216.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dockner, Engelbert & Feichtinger, Gustav & Mehlmann, Alexander, 1989. "Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-20, January.
- Berck, Peter & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1982.
"An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations,"
Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series
qt876499mq, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Charles, Anthony T., 1986. "Coastal state fishery development : Foreign fleets and optimal investment dynamics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 331-358, December.
- Charles, Anthony T. & Munro, Gordon R., 1985. "Irreversible Investment and Optimal Fisheries Management: A Stochastic Analysis," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 1(3).
- Rosenman, Robert E., 1986. "The optimal tax for maximum economic yield: Fishery regulation under rational expectations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 348-362, December.
- Kamien, Morton & Levhari, David & Mirman, Leonard J., 1985. "Dynamic model of fishing: The relationship to conjectural variations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 308-321, December.
- David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
- Campbell, H. F., 1996. "Prospects for an international tuna resource owners' cartel," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 419-427, September.
- Bulte, E.H. & Folmer, H. & Heijman, W.J.M., 1995.
"Open access, common property and scarcity rent in fisheries,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-80137, Tilburg University.
- Erwin Bulte & Henk Folmer & Wim Heijman, 1995. "Open access, common property and scarcity rent in fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(4), pages 309-320, December.
- Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
- Sumaila, Ussif Rashid, 1995. "Irreversible Capital Investment in a Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 10(3).
- Gordon R. Munro, 1982. "Fisheries, Extended Jurisdiction and the Economics of Common Property Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(3), pages 405-25, August.
- Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July.
- Clark, Colin W. & Munro, Gordon R., 1975. "The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 92-106, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Web Technician).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.