Prospects for an international tuna resource owners' cartel
AbstractThe paper briefly describes the world tuna industry and develops estimates of the elasticities of supply and demand for tuna harvested in the Pacific Islands Region (PIR), which supplies around one-third of the world catch. The elasticity estimates are used to estimate the effect on the revenues received by the PIR of a small increase in the royalty charged for access to the resource. The results suggest that there is a potential for the tuna resource owners of the region to improve their returns through collective action and the exercise of market power.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.
Volume (Year): 20 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
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- Ruseski, Gorazd, 1999. "Market Power, Management Regimes, And Strategic Conservation Of Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 14(2).
- Yoav Wachsman, 2002. "A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries," Working Papers 200216, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
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