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Using Emissions Trading to Regulate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Overview of Policy Design and Implementation Issues

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Fischer, Carolyn () (Resources for the Future)
Toman, Michael
Kerr, Suzi

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Abstract

In Kyoto in 1997, the US government agreed that between 2008 and 2012 it would limit average annual emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to seven percent below 1990 levels. As participants in the climate policy debate consider various means by which limits on US GHG emissions might be undertaken in the wake of the Kyoto agreement, there is considerable interest but also some confusion about how a GHG trading program could be organized and operated in practice. In this paper we address several aspects of policy design for a US system, such as who and what is covered by regulation, the organization of the trading system, how carbon permits are allocated, and how a system could be initiated and changed over time. The paper synthesizes existing analyses and adds new insights concerning uncertainty, intertemporal consistency, market institutions, and interactions with the tax system. Our fundamental conclusion is that a domestic "cap-and-trade" system with homogeneous permits applied to control flows of fossil fuels "upstream" in the energy system (along with selective inclusion of other gases and CO2 "sinks"), with permits auctioned periodically by the government, has the most appeal of different trading systems on efficiency and distributional grounds, though it may suffer politically because of its close resemblance to a carbon tax. We identify auction mechanisms that appear to be feasible and efficient for carbon permit allocation. We further argue that while the private sector should bear the "external" risk of changes in total permit availability as a consequence of modifications in international agreements, and that an auctioned upstream program provides more protection against the "internal" risk of efficiency-reducing opportunism by government regulators than other trading mechanisms.

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Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-98-40.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 1998
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Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-98-40

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  1. George R. Zodrow, 1995. "Economic Issues in the Taxation of Capital Gains," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 21(s1), pages 27-57, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Parry, Ian & Goulder, Lawrence & Williams III, Roberton, 1997. "When Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets," Discussion Papers dp-97-18-rev, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Auerbach, Alan J, 1992. "On the Design and Reform of Capital-Gains Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 263-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Burman, Leonard E & Randolph, William C, 1994. "Measuring Permanent Responses to Capital-Gains Tax Changes in Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 794-809, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Minh Ha-Duong & Michael Grubb & Jean-Charles Hourcade, 1997. "Influence of socioeconomic inertia and uncertainty on optimal CO2-emission abatement," Post-Print halshs-00002452_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jaffe, Adam B. & Stavins, Robert N., 1994. "The energy paradox and the diffusion of conservation technology," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 91-122, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Parry Ian W. H., 1995. "Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages S64-S77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Goulder Lawrence H., 1995. "Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-297, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Grubb, Michael, 1997. "Technologies, energy systems and the timing of CO2 emissions abatement : An overview of economic issues," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 159-172, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter, 1998. "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Discussion Papers dp-98-34, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Parry, Ian & Toman, Michael, 2000. "Early Emissions Reduction Programs: An Application to CO2 Policy," Discussion Papers dp-00-26, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Zhang, ZhongXiang, 1998. "Towards a successful international greenhouse gas emissions trading," MPRA Paper 13023, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Fischer, Carolyn & Hoffmann, Sandra & Yoshino , Yutaka, 2002. "Multilateral Trade Agreements and Market-Based Environmental Policies," Discussion Papers dp-02-28, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stavins, Robert & Hahn, Robert, 1999. "What Has Kyoto Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradable Permit Markets," Discussion Papers dp-99-30, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  5. DAUBANES Julien, 2009. "Changement climatique, instruments économiques et propositions pour un accord post-Kyoto : une synthèse," Working Papers 09.19.295, LERNA, University of Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  6. Zeuli, Kimberly A. & Skees, Jerry R., 2000. "Will Southern Agriculture Play A Role In A Carbon Market?," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 32(02), August. [Downloadable!]
  7. James Boyce & Matthew Riddle & Mark D Brenner, 2005. "A Chinese Sky Trust? Distributional Impacts of Carbon charges and Revenue Recycling in China," Working Papers wp_brenner_riddle_boyce, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. [Downloadable!]
  8. Zhang, ZhongXiang, 1998. "The design and implementation of an international trading scheme for greenhouse gas emissions," MPRA Paper 13046, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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