Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Do the Laws of Tax Incidence Hold? Point of Collection and the Pass-through of State Diesel Taxes

Contents:

Author Info

  • Wojciech Kopczuk
  • Justin Marion
  • Erich Muehlegger
  • Joel Slemrod

Abstract

The canonical theory of taxation holds that the incidence of a tax is independent of the side of the market which is responsible for remitting the tax to the government. However, this prediction does not survive in certain circumstances, for example when the ability to evade taxes differs across economic agents. In this paper, we estimate in the context of state diesel fuel taxes how the incidence of a quantity tax depends on the point of tax collection, where the level of the supply chain responsible for remitting the tax varies across states and over time. Our results indicate that moving the point of tax collection from the retail station to higher in the supply chain substantially raises the pass-through of diesel taxes to the retail price. Furthermore, tax revenues respond positively to collecting taxes from the distributor or prime supplier rather than from the retailer, suggesting that evasion is the likely explanation for the incidence result.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19410.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19410.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19410

Note: EEE PE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Poterba, James M., 1996. "Retail Price Reactions to Changes in State and Local Sales Taxes," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 49(2), pages 165-76, June.
  2. Wojciech Kopczuk, 2004. "Tax bases, tax rates and the elasticity of reported income," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0304-15, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  3. �ureo de Paula & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2010. "Value-Added Taxes, Chain Effects, and Informality," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 195-221, October.
  4. Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, 2000. "The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income," NBER Working Papers 7922, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. repec:uai:wpaper:inv001 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, 1998. "Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 6667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Niemeier, D. & Gould, Gregory & Karner, Alex & Hixson, Mark & Bachmann, Brooke & Okma, Carrie & Lang, Ziv & Heres Del Valle, David, 2008. "Rethinking downstream regulation: California's opportunity to engage households in reducing greenhouse gases," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 3436-3447, September.
  8. Aldy, Joseph E. & Ley, Eduardo & Parry, Ian, 2008. "A Tax–Based Approach to Slowing Global Climate Change," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 61(3), pages 493-517, September.
  9. Emmanuel Saez & Manos Matsaganis & Panos Tsakloglou, 2012. "Earnings Determination and Taxes: Evidence From a Cohort-Based Payroll Tax Reform in Greece," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 493-533.
  10. Barnett, Paul G. & Keeler, Theodore E. & Hu, Teh-wei, 1995. "Oligopoly structure and the incidence of cigarette excise taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 457-470, July.
  11. Fischer, Carolyn & Kerr, Suzi & Toman, Michael, 1998. "Using Emissions Trading to Regulate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Overview of Policy Design and Implementation Issues," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 3), pages 453-64, September.
  12. Chouinard, Hayley & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 2003. "Incidence of federal and state gasoline taxes," CUDARE Working Paper Series, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy 952, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
  13. Vito Tanzi, 1992. "Theory and Policy: A Comment on Dixit and on Current Tax Theory," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(4), pages 957-966, December.
  14. Joel Slemrod, 1998. "A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation," NBER Working Papers 6582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2009. "Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(1), pages 63-83, Winter.
  16. Jesse Rothstein, 2010. "Is the EITC as Good as an NIT? Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax Incidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 177-208, February.
  17. Chernick, Howard & Reschovsky, Andrew, 1997. "Who Pays the Gasoline Tax?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 50(2), pages 233-59, June.
  18. Peter Sørensen, 1994. "From the global income tax to the dual income tax: Recent tax reforms in the Nordic countries," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 57-79, February.
  19. Claudio Agostini & Claudia Martinez, 2013. "Tax Credits Response to Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Chile," Working Papers, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government wp_029, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government.
  20. Justin Marion & Erich Muehlegger, 2008. "Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: Tax Evasion and the Dyeing of Untaxed Diesel," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(4), pages 633-666, 08.
  21. James Kau & Paul Rubin, 1981. "The size of government," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 261-274, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Todd Kumler & Eric Verhoogen & Judith A. Frías, 2013. "Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico," NBER Working Papers 19385, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Doerrenberg, Philipp & Duncan, Denvil, 2014. "Tax Incidence in the Presence of Tax Evasion," IZA Discussion Papers 8137, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.