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What Has Kyoto Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradable Permit Markets

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Stavins, Robert
Hahn, Robert

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Abstract

This paper investigates a central issue in the climate change debate associated with the Kyoto Protocol: the likely performance of international greenhouse gas trading mechanisms. Virtually all design studies and many projections of the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets have assumed that an international trading program can be established that minimizes the costs of meeting overall goals. This conclusion rests on several simplifying assumptions. In this paper, the authors focus on one important issue that has received little, if any, attention: the interaction between an international trading regime and a heterogeneous set of domestic greenhouse policy instruments. This is an important issue because the Protocol explicitly provides for domestic sovereignty regarding instrument choice, and because it is unlikely that most countries will choose tradable permits as their primary domestic vehicle. It is true that costs can be minimized if all countries use domestic tradable permit systems to meet their national targets (allocate permits to private parties) and allow for international trades. But when some countries use non-trading approaches such as greenhouse-gas taxes or fixed quantity standards — which seems likely in the light of previous experience — cost minimization is hardly assured. In these cases, achieving the potential cost savings of international trading will require some form of project-by-project credit program, such as joint implementation. But theory and experience with such credit programs suggest that they are much less likely to facilitate major cost savings, because of large transactions costs, likely government participation, and absence of a well functioning market. Thus, individual nations' choices of domestic policy instruments to meet the Kyoto targets can limit substantially the cost-saving potential of an international trading program. There is an important trade-off between the degree of domestic sovereignty and the degree of cost effectiveness. Moreover, there is a need to analyze the likely cost-savings from feasible, as opposed to idealized, international policy approaches to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.

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Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-99-30.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-99-30

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barrett, Scott, 1998. "Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 20-39, Winter.
  2. Fischer, Carolyn & Toman, Michael & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Using Emissions Trading to Regulate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Overview of Policy Design and Implementation Issues," Discussion Papers dp-98-40, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  3. Schmalensee, Richard, et al, 1998. "An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 53-68, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bohm, Peter & Carlen, Bjorn, 1999. "Emission quota trade among the few: laboratory evidence of joint implementation among committed countries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-66, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stavins, Robert, 1997. "Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?," Discussion Papers dp-97-11, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stavins, Robert N, 1998. "What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 69-88, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, 2006. "An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 35-38, May. [Downloadable!]
  2. Barrett, Scott & Stavins, Robert, 2002. "Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements," Working Paper Series rwp02-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Sudhir A. Shah, 2008. "An Economic Theory of Emission Cap Determination by an International Agreement," Working Papers id:1564, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mustafa Babiker, . "Environment and Development in Arab Countries: Economic Impacts of Climate Change Policies in the GCC Region," API-Working Paper Series 0306, Arab Planning Institute - Kuwait, Information Center. [Downloadable!]
  5. Stavins, Robert, 2000. "A Two-Way Street Between Environmental Economics and Public Policy," Working Paper Series rwp00-005, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  6. Toman, Michael & Shogren, Jason, 2000. "Climate Change Policy," Discussion Papers dp-00-22, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  7. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Can an Effective Global Climate Treaty Be Based on Sound Science, Rational Economics, and Pragmatic Politics?," Discussion Papers dp-04-28, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Toman, Michael, 2003. "Economic Analysis and the Formulation of U.S. Climate Policy," Discussion Papers dp-02-59, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  9. Stavins, Robert, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Global Climate Change Policy: A Primer," Working Paper Series rwp00-003, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  10. Sudhir A. Shah, 2000. "An Economic Theory of Emission Cap Determination by an International Agreement," Working papers 88, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Matti Liski & Juha Virrankoski, 2004. "Frictions in Project-Based Supply of Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(3), pages 347-365, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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