Credit Risk Transfer: To Sell or to Insure
AbstractThis paper analyzes credit risk transfer in banking. Specifically, we model loan sales and loan insurance (e.g. credit default swaps) as the two instruments of risk transfer. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the adverse selection problem is as relevant in loan insurance as it is in loan sales. Contrary to previous literature, this paper allows for informational asymmetries in both markets. We show how credit risk transfer can achieve optimal investment and minimize the social costs associated with excess risk taking by a bank. Furthermore, we find that no separation of loan types can occur in equilibrium. Our results show that a well capitalized bank will tend to use loan insurance regardless of loan quality in the presence of moral hazard and relationship banking costs of loan sales. Finally, we show that a poorly capitalized bank may be forced into the loan sales market, even in the presence of possibly significant relationship and moral hazard costs that can depress the selling price.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1131.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
credit risk transfer; banking; loan sales; loan insurance; credit derivatives;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-08-08 (Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2007-08-08 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-IAS-2007-08-08 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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