Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem
AbstractThe empty creditor problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex ante and ex post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without insurance through credit default swaps (CDS). We show that CDS, and the empty creditors they give rise to, have important ex ante commitment benefits: By strengthening creditors' bargaining power, they raise the debtor's pledgeable income and help reduce the incidence of strategic default. However, we also show that lenders will over-insure in equilibrium, giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy. We discuss a number of remedies that have been proposed to overcome the inefficiency resulting from excess insurance. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org., Oxford University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 24 (2011)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.
Web page: http://www.rfs.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2010. "Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem," NBER Working Papers 15999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2011.
"Tranching, CDS and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1809, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2011. "Tranching, CDS and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000192, David K. Levine.
- Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2011. "Tranching, CDS and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1809R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2011. "Tranching, CDS and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000168, David K. Levine.
- Mikhail Chernov & Alexander S.Gorbenko & Igor Makarov, 2011.
FMG Discussion Papers
dp688, Financial Markets Group.
- Stefan Arping, 2012. "Credit Protection and Lending Relationships," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-142/IV/DSF48, Tinbergen Institute.
- Patrick Augustin, 2012. "Sovereign Credit Default Swap Premia," Working Papers 12-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.