We develop the theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching mechanisms. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different mechanisms and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing exact mappings between matching technologies and informational constraints.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General
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