A new stationary game equilibrium induced by stochastic group evolution and rational Individual choice
AbstractIn the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40133.
Date of creation: 15 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Stochastic replicator dynamics; Rational choice; Normal-form game equilibrium; Stability;
Other versions of this item:
- Dai, Darong & Shen, Kunrong, 2012. "A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice," MPRA Paper 40586, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Aug 2012.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-07-29 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-07-29 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-07-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2012-07-29 (Operations Research)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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