A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms
AbstractThis work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of bilateral matching mechanisms and studies their properties in a systematic manner. By providing a unified framework to study ilateral matching mechanisms, we formalize how different spatial/informational constraints can be implemented via a careful selection of matching mechanisms. In particular, this paper explains why and how various matching mechanisms generate different degrees of information isolation in the economy
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 10.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
spatial interactions; matching; information frictions;
Other versions of this item:
- Aliprantis, C.D. & Camera, G. & Puzzello, D., 2003. "A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1165, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2002.
"A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis,"
0211, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2005. "A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 463-484, June.
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Staff Report 346, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Glen Ellison, 2010.
"Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
631, David K. Levine.
- Ellison, Glenn, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996.
"Money is memory,"
218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Shouyong Shi, 1996.
"A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money,"
930, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2000.
"Dynamic monetary equilibrium in a random-matching economy,"
Working Paper Series
WP-00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2002. "Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 929-969, May.
- Diamond, Peter A, 1982.
"Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Diamond, Peter, 1989.
"Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium,"
3374509, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1989. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 606-19, June.
- Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Avinash Dixit, 2001.
"On Modes of Economic Governance,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
589, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dean Corbae & Ted Temzelides & Randall Wright, 2003. "Directed Matching and Monetary Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 731-756, 05.
- Pissarides, Christopher A, 1987. "Search, Wage Bargains and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 473-83, July.
- Dale T. Mortensen & Christopher A. Pissarides, 1993.
"Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0110, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 397-415, July.
- Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
- Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-51, September.
- Aliprantis, C. D. & Camera, G. & Puzzelo, D., 2004.
"A Random Matching Theory,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1168, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.