Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms

Contents:

Author Info

  • C.D. Aliprantis
  • G. Camera

Abstract

This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of bilateral matching mechanisms and studies their properties in a systematic manner. By providing a unified framework to study ilateral matching mechanisms, we formalize how different spatial/informational constraints can be implemented via a careful selection of matching mechanisms. In particular, this paper explains why and how various matching mechanisms generate different degrees of information isolation in the economy

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.16621.1070208421.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 10.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:10

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: spatial interactions; matching; information frictions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
  2. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 397-415, July.
  3. Shouyong Shi, 1997. "A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 75-102, January.
  4. Avinash Dixit, 2001. "On Modes of Economic Governance," CESifo Working Paper Series 589, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-51, September.
  6. P. Diamond, 1980. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 268, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 346, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 631, David K. Levine.
  10. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1987. "Search, Wage Bargains and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 473-83, July.
  11. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
  12. Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2000. "Dynamic monetary equilibrium in a random-matching economy," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago WP-00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  13. Dean Corbae & Ted Temzelides & Randall Wright, 2003. "Directed Matching and Monetary Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 731-756, 05.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Aliprantis, C. D. & Camera, G. & Puzzelo, D., 2004. "A Random Matching Theory," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1168, Purdue University, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.