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A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms

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  • Aliprantis, C.D.
  • Camera, G.
  • Puzzello, D.

Abstract

This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of bilateral matching mechanisms and studies their properties in a systematic manner. By providing a unified framework to study bilateral matching mechanisms, we formalize how different spatial/informational constraints can be implemented via a careful selection of matching mechanisms. In particular, this paper explains why and how various matching mechanisms generate different degrees of information isolation in the economy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1165.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1165

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Keywords: Bilateral matching ; Frictions ; Anonymous trading ; Spatial interactions;

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References

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  1. Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2002. "Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 929-969, May.
  2. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 631, David K. Levine.
  3. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1987. "Search, Wage Bargains and Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 473-83, July.
  4. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 346, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Avinash Dixit, 2003. "On Modes of Economic Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(2), pages 449-481, March.
  6. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
  7. Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Dean Corbae & Ted Temzelides & Randall Wright, 2003. "Directed Matching and Monetary Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 731-756, 05.
  9. Dale T. Mortensen & Christopher A. Pissarides, 1993. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp0110, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  10. Shouyong Shi, 1996. "A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 930, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
  12. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 830-51, September.
  13. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Wright, Randall, 1989. "On Money as a Medium of Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 927-54, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Aliprantis, C. D. & Camera, G. & Puzzelo, D., 2004. "A Random Matching Theory," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics 1168, Purdue University, Department of Economics.

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