Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Kyota Eguchi, 2000. "Employment Protection Regulations and New Hiring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-88, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
2. Armin Falk & David Huffman & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2008. "Institutions and Contract Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 13961, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Falk, Armin & Huffman, David & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2008. "Institutions and Contract Enforcement," IZA Discussion Papers 3435, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Armin Falk & David Huffman & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2008. "Institutions and Contract Enforcement," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
3. Andrea Ichino & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Diskussionsschriften dp0319, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 987, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Gerd Muehlheusser & Andrea Ichino, 2004. "How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 60, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008. "How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 820-831, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint Paul, 2000. "Hiring and Firing Costs, Adverse Selection and Long-term Unemployment," Economics Working Papers 447, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Kugler, Adriana D. & Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "Hiring and Firing Costs, Adverse Selection and Long-term Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 134, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
5. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 1991. "Work Incentives and the Demand for Primary and Contingent Labor," NBER Working Papers 3647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. W. Bentley MacLeod & Voraprapa Nakavachara, 2006. "Legal Default Rules: The Case of Wrongful Discharge Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 1970, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • W. Bentley MacLeod & Voraprapa Nakavachara, 2006. "Legal default rules: The case of wrongful discharge laws," Discussion Papers 0506-19, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. James B. Rebitzer & Michael D. Robinson, 1991. "Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 3587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Rebitzer, James B & Robinson, Michael D, 1991. "Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 710-15, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Malo, M.A aand Joaquin Pérez., 2002. "Individual dismissals in Europe and the United States: A model on the influence of the legal framework on firing costs," Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo 9/02, Programa de doctorado en Economía. Universidad de Alcalá.. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Miguel Malo & Joaquín Pérez, 2003. "Individual Dismissals in Europe and the United States: A Model on the Influence of the Legal Framework on Firing Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 47-63, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Andrew Weiss & Ruqu Wang, 1990. "A Sorting Model of Labor Contracts: Implications for Layoffs and Wage-Tenure Profiles," NBER Working Papers 3448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. John T. Addison, 2006. "Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Rent Seeking, Alliances, Raising Rivals’ Costs (Even Lowering One’s Own?), and Interjurisdictional Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 2381, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
11. Susan N. Houseman, 2000. "Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing Arrangements: Evidence from an Establishment Survey," Staff Working Papers 01-67, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. David H. Autor & John J. Donohue III & Stewart J. Schwab, 2003. "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws," NBER Working Papers 9425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David H Autor & John J Donohue & Stewart J Schwab, 2006. "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(2), pages 211-231, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)