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Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts

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Author Info
Vincent P. Crawford

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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 585.

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Date of creation: Feb 1986
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Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:585

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Related research
Keywords: contract theory; bargaining theory;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D29 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Other
D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution

Cited by:
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  1. de Meza, David & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "Too Much Investment : A Problem Of Coordination Failure," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 703, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Darlene C. Chisholm, 1993. "Asset Specificity and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of the Motion-Pictures Industry," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 143-155, Spring. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jonker,N. & Grip,A.,de, 1999. "Do employees with Flexible Contracts receive less Training?," Research Memoranda 001, Maastricht : ROA, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2005. "Contracting on Time," Working Papers w0059, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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