This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Case for Affirmative Action in Competition Policy

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
VILLENEUVE, BERTRAND
ZHANG, VANESSA YANHUA

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9700/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9700.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 23 Jul 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9700

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Competition policy capacity accumulation Cournot competition asymmetric duopoly regulatory consistency differential games.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All the bibliographic data shown here has been contributed by volunteers, thereby helping to keep this service free.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.