Wage Differences, Bonus and Team Performances: A parametric non-linear integer programming model
AbstractWe formulate a non-linear integer programming model and use plausible parameters to examine: (i) the effects of wage differences between Super- and Normal- players in the performance of four teams which participate in the UEFA CL group matches; (ii) whether the expected qualification bonus received by UEFA and paid to the players of the non-qualified teams, enhances effort and the teams manage to qualify. When performance is measured by points’ maximization, higher wage equality seems to improve the performance of three teams, irrespectively if the elasticity of substitution between Super- and Normal- players is high or low, while the most efficient team of the tournament is not affected by the wage structure. The U-formed performance for that team is not excluded. When performance is measured by profits’ maximization, the performance depends on both the “production” technology and on wage differences. When all teams operate under increasing returns and all pay the same, but varying relative wages, or when they operate under decreasing returns and pay the marginal value product of their players, the most “balanced” team performs better. The most “unbalanced” team performs best under increasing returns to scale and egalitarian wages. In the last case, the non-qualified teams did not manage to improve their performance and qualify, even if their players should receive the expected qualification bonus that UEFA pays.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8719.
Date of creation: 10 May 2008
Date of revision:
Players; Teams; Wages; Bonus; Performance; Tournament;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-05-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-05-17 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2008-05-17 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Egon Franck & Stephan Nüesch, 2007.
"Wage Dispersion and Team Performance - An Empirical Panel Analysis,"
0017, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
- Egon Franck & Stephan Nüesch, 2007. "Wage Dispersion and Team Performance - An Empirical Panel Analysis," Working Papers 0073, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
- Hirotsu Nobuyoshi & Wright Mike B, 2006. "Modeling Tactical Changes of Formation in Association Football as a Zero-Sum Game," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 1-22, April.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.