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房产税公平感与税收遵从的实验研究
[An Experimental Study of the Sense of Property Tax Fairness and Tax Compliance]

Author

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  • 姚, 涛
  • 李, 佳沨
  • 陈, 培峰

Abstract

房产税不遵从伴随着房产税的出现而出现，它是破坏政府征税能力的一种行为，会给国家的经济和社会发展带来负面影响。房产税遵从度受到多种因素影响，公平感是其中的重要因素之一。采用情景实验法，主要研究三方面的内容：一是纳税人在与不同水平的参照对象进行比较时产生的比较公平感；二是纳税人在不同税收执法情况下产生的程序公平感；三是比较公平感和程序公平感对房产税遵从水平的影响。通过以上研究探讨提高房产税遵从水平的方法。研究发现，房产税税负水平显著影响比较公平感，执法公平显著影响程序公平感，房产税遵从水平受到比较公平感和程序公平感的共同影响。最后根据研究结果提出了提高房产税遵从度的建议。

Suggested Citation

  • 姚, 涛 & 李, 佳沨 & 陈, 培峰, 2017. "房产税公平感与税收遵从的实验研究 [An Experimental Study of the Sense of Property Tax Fairness and Tax Compliance]," MPRA Paper 84494, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:84494
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alm, James & Jackson, Betty & McKee, Michael J., 1992. "Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance With Experimental Data," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 45(1), pages 107-114, March.
    2. Alm, James & Jackson, Betty & McKee, Michael J., 1992. "Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 45(1), pages 107-14, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    房产税；比较公平感；程序公平感；税收遵从;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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