Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Individual styles of tax evasion: an experimental study

Contents:

Author Info

  • Luigi Mittone

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it/papers/papero02_02.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia in its series CEEL Working Papers with number 0202.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:0202

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Inama 5, 38100 Trento
Phone: +39-461-882201
Fax: +39-461-882222
Web page: http://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
  2. Baldry, J. C., 1986. "Tax evasion is not a gamble : A report on two experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 333-335.
  3. Pham Chung, 1976. "On Complaints about "High" Taxes: An Analytical Note," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 31(1), pages 125-31.
  4. Gordon, James P. P., 1989. "Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 797-805, April.
  5. Naylor, Robin, 1987. "Strikes, Free Riders and Social Customs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 275, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  6. Robben, Henry S. J. & Webley, Paul & Weigel, Russell H. & Warneryd, Karl-Erik & Kinsey, Karyl A. & Hessing, Dick J. & Martin, Francisco Alvira & Elffers, Henk & Wahlund, Richard & Van Langenhove, Luk, 1990. "Decision frame and opportunity as determinants of tax cheating : An international experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 341-364, September.
  7. Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1996. "A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, April.
  8. Spicer, M W & Lundstedt, S B, 1976. "Understanding Tax Evasion," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 31(2), pages 295-305.
  9. Luigi Mittone, 1997. "Subjective versus objective probability: results from seven experiments on fiscal evasion," CEEL Working Papers 9704, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  10. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
  11. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Chang, Otto H. & Nichols, Donald R. & Schultz, Joseph J., 1987. "Taxpayer attitudes toward tax audit risk," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 299-309, September.
  13. Wang, Leonard F.S. & Conant, John L., 1988. "Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(4), pages 579-81, December.
  14. Alm, James & Jackson, Betty & McKee, Michael J., 1992. "Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 45(1), pages 107-14, March.
  15. Spicer, Michael W. & Hero, Rodney E., 1985. "Tax evasion and heuristics : A research note," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 263-267, March.
  16. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics: An Introduction to Kantian Economics," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 42(168), pages 430-37, November.
  17. Becker, Winfried & Buchner, Heinz-Jurgen & Sleeking, Simon, 1987. "The impact of public transfer expenditures on tax evasion : An experimental approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 243-252, November.
  18. Friedland, Nehemiah & Maital, Shlomo & Rutenberg, Aryeh, 1978. "A simulation study of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 107-116, August.
  19. Hite, Peggy A, 1987. "An Application of Attribution Theory in Taxpayer Noncompliance Research," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 42(1), pages 105-18.
  20. Leonard F.S. Wang, 1990. "Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions with Endogenous Probability of Detection," Public Finance Review, , vol. 18(4), pages 480-487, October.
  21. Fishburn, Geoffrey, 1979. "On How to Keep Tax Payers Honest (or Almost So)," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(150), pages 267-70, September.
  22. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
  23. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. " Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Sandro Casal & Luigi Mittone, 2014. "Social Esteem versus Social Stigma: the role of anonymity in an income reporting game," CEEL Working Papers 1401, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:0202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marco Tecilla).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.