What twenty years of regulations have to say about M&As of U.S. banks?

We extend the U.S. bank M&As literature by examining announcement returns for acquisitions of both listed and unlisted targets by U.S. banking firms for a long period of time from the eighties till to date. Over these decades there have been implemented several regulation changes, notably the Dodd-Frank Act that would be of interest to examine whether they have any impact, and if indeed they have to which direction, on value creation in M&As in the U.S. banking industry. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that bidding banks lose upon the announcement of a merger, we find positive abnormal returns for these firms that choose to acquire privately-held targets. Further, returns for acquirers in private offers do not depend on the method of payment, legislative changes, size, or geographical scope. However, we find that the use of a financial advisor on the part of the bidder can better explain the variation in abnormal returns for such offers. Our results are not influenced by any unobserved bidder-specific component or sample selection issues.