How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systemically important?
AbstractThis paper estimates the value of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidy. Using data from the merger boom of 1991-2004, the authors find that banking organizations were willing to pay an added premium for mergers that would put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF. They estimate at least $14 billion in added premiums for the eight merger deals that brought the organizations to over $100 billion in assets. In addition, the authors find that both the stock and bond markets reacted positively to these deals. Their estimated TBTF subsidy is large enough to create serious concern, since recent assisted mergers have allowed TBTF organizations to become even bigger and for nonbanks to become part of TBTF banking organizations, thus extending the TBTF subsidy beyond banking.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in its series Working Papers with number 09-34.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Elijah Brewer & Julapa Jagtiani, 2013. "How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 1-35, February.
- Elijah Brewer, III & Julapa Jagtiani, 2011. "How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systematically important?," Working Papers 11-37, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- The economics of enormity
by ? in Free exchange on 2012-11-03 14:44:50
- We Must 'Stand Up to Concentrated and Powerful Corporate Interests'
by ? in Economist's View on 2012-11-08 18:41:53
- 10 Tuesday PM Reads
by Barry Ritholtz in The Big Picture on 2012-11-13 21:00:42
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13-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 04 Feb 2014.
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