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Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate

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  • Semenov, Aggey

Abstract

The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a key government department. The operating unit of the department has private information about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the Senate is sufficiently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more authority. On the other hand, given the Senate's ideal point, when the information is more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6988.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6988

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Keywords: Appointments; bargaining; veto-based delegation; constrained delegation;

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  1. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  2. Snyder, Susan K & Weingast, Barry R, 2000. "The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 269-305, October.
  3. Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2005. "Optimal Delegation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5289, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
  5. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "Veto-Based Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 129, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Moe, Terry M, 1991. "Politics and the Theory of Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 106-29, Special I.
  7. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Continuity in mechanism design without transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 182-189, November.
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Cited by:
  1. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586854 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Kovác, Eugen & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Optimal Sequential Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 427, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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