The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a key government department. The operating unit of the department has private information about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the Senate is sufficiently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more authority. On the other hand, given the Senate's ideal point, when the information is more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
6988.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2004.
"Veto-Based Delegation,"
Discussion Papers
129, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised Jan 2005.
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