Empire-building and Price competition
AbstractThis paper is among the first to theoretically examine the relevance of price competition in the protection market by focusing on the competition between empires. By distinguishing absolute and differential protection rents, we first define coercive rivalry and price competition among empires and then establish three types of empires: early empires of domination (like Akkadian empire), territorial empires (like Russian empire), and merchant empires (like Venetian empire). Empires are structured on the basis of two types of hierarchies that determine their protection costs: ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up.’ We systematically study the impact of asymmetrical protection costs on price competition in the light of Bertrand equilibria. We provide an economic rationale for the use of violence throughout history in conformity with the findings of economic historians.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48225.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision: Apr 2013
Absolute and differential protection rents; Bertrand equilibrium; Empires of domination; Merchant empires; Territorial Empires;
Other versions of this item:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2013-07-20 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-COM-2013-07-20 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HIS-2013-07-20 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-IND-2013-07-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2013-07-20 (Microeconomics)
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