Evolution towards efficient coordination in repeated games, preliminary version
AbstractWe show that in long repeated games- or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one- payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. Strategies following some simple and intuitive "behavioral maxims" are shown to be able to drive out inefficient ones from a population. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games that will be further investigated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39311.
Date of creation: 07 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Repeated Games; Evolution; Communication; Efficiency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-06-25 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-25 (Microeconomics)
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